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We consider noncooperative energy-eﬃcient resource allocation in the interference channel. Energy eﬃciency is achieved when
each system pays a price proportional to its allocated transmit power. In noncooperative game-theoretic notation, the power
allocation chosen by the systems corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. We study the existence and characterize the uniqueness
of this equilibrium. Afterwards, pricing to achieve energy-eﬃciency is examined. We introduce an arbitrator who determines the
prices that satisfy minimum QoS requirements and minimize total power consumption. This energy-eﬃcient assignment problem
is formulated and solved. We compare our setting to that without pricing with regard to energy-eﬃciency by simulation. It is
observed that pricing in this distributed setting achieves higher energy-eﬃciency in diﬀerent interference regimes.
1. Introduction
Power management and energy-eﬃcient communication
is an important topic in future mobile communications
and computing systems. Currently, 0.14% of the carbon
emissions are contributed by the mobile telecommunications
industry [1]. In order to improve the situation, we study
new algorithms at physical and multiple-access layers. This
includes resource allocation and power allocation. A com-
mon mobile communication scenario is where several com-
munication system pairs utilize the same frequencies and are
within interference range from one another. This setting is
modeled by the interference channel (IFC). The transmitter-
receiver pairs could belong to diﬀerent operators and these
are not necessarily connected. Therefore, noncooperative
operation of the systems is assumed.
In a noncooperative scenario without pricing, systems
transmit at highest possible powers to maximize their data
rates. Transmitting at high powers, however, is detrimental
to other users, because it induces interference which reduces
their data rates. In such settings, spectrum sharing might
lead to suboptimal operating points or equilibria [2]. The
case of distributed resource allocation and the conflicts in
noncooperative spectrum sharing are best analyzed using
noncooperative game theory (e.g., for CDMA uplink in [3]
and usage of auction mechanisms in [4]). An overview of
power control using game theory is presented in [5]. More-
over, analysis of noncooperative and cooperative settings
using game theory are performed in [6].
Studies have shown that the point of equilibrium in
a noncooperative game is ineﬃcient but can be improved
by introducing a linear pricing [7]. Linear pricing means
that each system has to pay an amount proportional to
its transmit power. This encourages transmission at lower
powers, which reduces the amount of interference and at
the same time leads to a Pareto improvement in the users’
payoﬀs. Pricing in multiple-access channels has also been
investigated with respect to energy-eﬃciency in [8]. Studies
in an economic framework demonstrates other advantages of
proper implementation of pricing, for example, it provides
incentives to service providers to upgrade their resources [9]
or increase revenue [10].
In [11], the energy-eﬃciency of point-to-point commu-
nication systems is improved by sophisticated adaptation
strategies. A coding theoretic approach is proposed in
[12] where “green codes” for energy-eﬃcient short-range
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communications are developed. Recent proposals define a
utility function which incorporates the cost of transmission,
for example, the price of spending power is considered in a
binary variable in [13] and as an inverse factor in [14].
A similar utility function as in this paper is proposed
in [15] for single-antenna systems and used to characterize
the Nash equilibrium for the noncooperative power control
game. Later in [16], the approach is extended to multiple-
antenna channels in a related noncooperative game-theoretic
setting. In [17], distributed pricing is introduced for power
control and beamforming design to improve sum rate.
Diﬀerent from previous works, we apply linear pricing to
improve the energy-eﬃciency of an IFC with noncooperative
selfish links to enable distributed implementation. Our
objectives also include global stability and fairness. Com-
pared to the work in [3], we do not assume that the channel
states are chosen such that a unique global stable Nash
equilibrium (NE) exists. Instead, we constrain the prices such
that uniqueness and global stability follows. We derive the
largest set of prices in which both the uniqueness of the
NE and concurrent transmission are guaranteed, which is
then utilized as a constraint in the optimization problem.
The contribution is the derivation of the optimal pricing
for transmit power minimization under minimum utility
requirements and spectrum sharing constraints. If the utility
requirements are feasible (Section 4.4), we derive a closed-
form expression for the optimal prices (Proposition 6).
Another relevant case is to minimize transmit powers such
that rate requirements and global stability as well as fairness
are achieved. These optimal power allocation and prices
are presented in Section 5.3 and feasibility is checked in
Proposition 8.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the sys-
tem, channel, and the game models are presented. The game
described is then studied in Section 3. Based on uniqueness
analysis of the Nash equilibrium, we formulate and solve
the energy-eﬃcient optimization problem with minimum
utility requirements and with minimum rate requirements
constraints in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6,
simulations comparing the setting with and without pricing
are presented. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. System Model. Two wireless links communicate on the
same frequency band at the same time. Transmitter Ti
intends to transmit its signal to its corresponding receiver Ri,
i ∈ {1, 2} (Figure 1). On simultaneous transmission, each
receiver obtains a superposition of the signals transmitted
from both transmitters. Assuming single-user decoding,
the interfering signal is treated as additive noise. This
system model can be extended to multiple system pairs. For
convenience, we focus our analysis on two pairs.
The described competing links belong to diﬀerent opera-
tors or wireless service providers. We assume that there exists
an entity which can control the operators indirectly by rules
or by changing their utility functions. We could think of














Figure 1: System model.
In contrast to common long-term regulation, the utility
function here changes on a smaller time-scale. The role of
the arbitrator which represents this authority is discussed in
Section 2.3.
A similar model is presented in the context of cognitive
radios in [18], where the primary user decides on the prices
which the secondary users have to pay for their transmission.
The choice of the prices is not only for interference control
but also for revenue maximization. The model in [19]
involves multiple entities, that is, the primary users, who
determine the prices imposed on secondary users to limit
their aggregate and per-carrier interference in a distributed
fashion.
2.2. Channel Model. We consider a quasistatic block-flat
fading IFC in standard form [20]. The direct channel
coeﬃcients are unity. The cross-channel coeﬃcients (CCC),
which are the squared amplitudes of the channel gains, from
Ti to Rj are denoted as αi j . The noise at the receivers is
independent additive white Gaussian with variance σ2. The
inverse noise power is denoted by ρ, that is, ρ = 1/σ2.
The transmitters and receivers are assumed to have perfect
channel state information (CSI). The maximum achievable











where pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is the transmit power of Ti. We assume
no power constraint on the transmitters, that is, pi ∈ R+. It is
shown later that the maximum power that would be utilized
is nevertheless bounded due to a pricing factor.
2.3. Game Model. A game in strategic form consists of a set
of players, a set of strategies that each player chooses from,
and the payoﬀs which each player receives on application of
a certain strategy profile. The players of our game are the
communication links and are denoted by the corresponding
subscript. The pure strategy of each player i, i ∈ {1, 2},
is the transmission power pi. The corresponding payoﬀ is







)− μi pi, i = 1, 2, (2)
where Ri(p1, p2) is given in (1) and μi > 0 is the power
price for player i. The second term in (2) is a pricing term,
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which linearly reduces the utility. This means that a payment
is demanded from the player for the amount of power used.
Without pricing, each user would use as much power as
possible to transmit his signal [21]. The game is written as
G = ({1, 2}, (R+,R+), {u1,u2}). (3)
We assume all players are rational and individually choose
their strategies to maximize their utilities. The game is
assumed to be static, which means that each player decides
for one strategy once and for all. The outcome of this game
is a Nash equilibrium (NE). An NE is a strategy profile
(pNE1 , p
NE
2 ) in which no player can unilaterally increase his











, ∀p1 ∈ R+, (4)
and similarly for player 2.
The best response, bri, of a player i is the strategy or set
of strategies that maximize his utility function for a given
strategy of the other player. Since the player’s utility function
is concave in his own strategy, the best response is unique
and given as the solution of the first derivative being zero.












, p2 ∈ R+, (5)
where (x)+ denotes max(x, 0). The highest power a transmit-









which is achieved when the counter transmitter allocates no
power, that is, pj = 0. Thus, the strategy region of player i
could be confined to [0, pmaxi ].
The authority that can control the elements of the game
is assumed to determine the power prices, μ1 and μ2. It
receives either utility or rate demands from the users and
checks if they are feasible. If they are, it calculates the prices
and informs the system pairs about the prices imposed on
them. The links will have to pay costs proportional to their
transmit power, that is, μ1p1 and μ2p2 (Figure 1). In game-
theoretic notation, this entity is called the arbitrator [22].
The arbitrator is not a player in the game and chooses the
equilibrium that meets certain criteria. In our case, these
criteria would be fairness, energy-eﬃciency, and minimum
utility requirements or minimum rate requirements. We
assume that the arbitrator also has complete game informa-
tion.
In contrast to the case in which a central controller
decides on the power of the users, the arbitrator imposes
prices such that the users voluntarily set their powers.
Thereby, the arbitrator indirectly determines the power
allocation. In this paper, we study short-term price adap-
tation based on perfect CSI where prices depend on the
instantaneous channel state. Long-term price adaptation
based on partial CSI can also be implemented but is not
considered here but left for future work.
3. Noncooperative Game
In this section, we study the game described in Section 2.3.
This is done by investigating the existence of pure strategy
NEs and characterizing the conditions for uniqueness.
3.1. Existence of Nash Equilibrium. There exists a pure
strategy NE in a game if the following two conditions
are satisfied [23]. First, the strategy spaces of the players
should be nonempty compact convex subsets of an Euclidean
space. Second, the utility functions of the players should be
continuous in the strategies of all players and quasiconcave
in the strategy of the corresponding player.
The first condition is satisfied in our game given in (3)
because the strategy space of player i is [0, pmaxi ] ⊂ R.
The second condition is satisfied for the following reasons.
First, it is obvious that the utility functions are continuous
in the players’ strategies. Second, knowing that all concave
functions are quasi-concave functions [24], we can prove
the concavity of our utility function with respect to the









1 + ρα21p2 + ρp1
)2 < 0. (7)
This condition is satisfied for player 1 and similarly for player
2. Next, we analyze the number of NEs that exist and state the
related conditions.
3.2. Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. In this section, we
study the conditions that lead to a unique NE. Under these
conditions and considering only the case where the spectrum
is simultaneously utilized by the two systems, we prove that
the best response dynamics are globally convergent. Under
these conditions, the noncooperative systems are guaranteed
to operate in the NE if they iteratively apply their best
response strategies.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique NE if and only if the


























Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Following the conditions in (8a) and (8b), we can easily
characterize the suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a
unique NE.
Corollary 2. There exists a unique NE if α12α21 < 1.
If the conditions in (8a) and (8b) are fulfilled simul-
taneously, both transmitters would be transmitting at the
same time. We denote this case as the concurrent transmission
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case. Next, we consider only this case since it is the fair
case where both systems operate simultaneously. The other
cases in which a unique NE exists correspond to one
transmitter allocating maximum transmit power and the
other not transmitting. The concurrent transmission case
satisfies α12α21 < 1, which is the suﬃcient condition for the
existence of a unique NE given in Corollary 2.
In the concurrent transmission case, the transmitters
operate in the unique NE which is a fixed point of the best
response function. In order to reach the NE, the best response
dynamics must globally converge.
Proposition 3. The best response dynamics globally converge
to the NE in the concurrent transmission case, that is, when
(8a) and (8b) hold simultaneously.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
In comparison to the IFC without pricing, the suﬃcient
conditions for global convergence of the best response
dynamics are identical. The reason for that is, however, not
obvious. The linear pricing in our utility function leads to a
translation of the best response function but as well changes
the interference conditions where concurrent transmission
takes place. This is seen in the conditions in (8a) and (8b)
where the bounds depend on the prices. Therefore, proving
the suﬃcient conditions for global convergence of the best
response dynamics is necessary in our case.
3.3. Admissible Power Prices. Given α12,α21, and ρ, there
exists a set of pricing pairs that achieves the concurrent
transmission case described above. We define the admissible
power pricing set M, which directly follows from the























All prices (μ1,μ2) ∈ M achieve NEs in the concurrent
transmission case. In the case that α12α21 > 1, the set M
is, however, empty, that is, there exists no power prices that
achieve the concurrent transmission case. This happens since
the upper bound on μ2 would be less than the lower bound
for any μ1, that is, μ̂2(μ1) < μ˘2(μ1). Another observation is
that the set M is convex only in the case if α12 < 1 and α21 < 1
both hold. This corresponds to the weak interference case. In
the case if one CCC is larger than one, but still the condition
α12α21 < 1 holds, the set M is not convex.
The unique NE in the concurrent transmission case as a

































where (μ1,μ2) ∈M and κ = 1/1− α12α21. Note that the [·]+
can be omitted because the concurrent transmission implies
that the power allocation of both systems are nonzero.
From the arbitrator’s point of view, all price tuples
(μ1,μ2) ∈ M lead to stable operating points in terms of
user strategies. By choosing diﬀerent prices, the arbitrator
can optimize a certain social welfare function. In the next
section, we propose to minimize the total transmit power
under utility requirements.
4. Energy-Efficient Assignment with
Utility Requirements
In this section, we investigate how the power prices are
chosen such that energy-eﬃciency as well as minimum utility
requirements are satisfied.
4.1. Optimization Problem. The arbitrator decides on the
power prices (μ1,μ2) such that the outcome satisfies the
following conditions.
(C1) The best response dynamics globally converge to the
unique NE.
(C2) Spectrum sharing (concurrent transmission) is
ensured so that it is fair for all users.
(C3) Users transmit at the lowest powers possible satisfy-
ing minimum utility requirement uri , i ∈ {1, 2}, to
promote eﬃcient energy usage.
If (μ1,μ2) ∈ M, conditions (C1) and (C2) are automat-
ically fulfilled. Condition (C3) can be achieved by optimiza-
tion. Hence, determining the optimal prices (μ∗1 ,μ
∗
2 ) is done










































The function in (12) is convex in (μ1,μ2) only in the weak
interference channel case, that is, α12, α21 < 1. Similarly, the
constraint set M is also only convex in the weak interference
channel case. Thus, the problem in (11a), (11b) and (11c)
is in general not a convex optimization problem. However,
a closed-form solution is possible, which will be shown in
Section 4.3. Before that, we will investigate some interesting
properties of the inverse power prices which will facilitate the
proof of the solution.

























Figure 2: F denotes the region of admissable inverse power prices
(ϕ1,ϕ2) whereas Uϕ denotes the region where utility requirements
(ur1,u
r




2 ) is at
the bottom tip of Uϕ. See text for more explanation.
4.2. Analysis in Inverse Price Space. In the following, we will
substitute the power prices with their inverse ϕi = 1/μi to
ease the analysis with regard to the power allocation and




















































) = α12ϕ1 − 1
ρ
(α12 − 1). (15b)
The admissable inverse power prices are contained in the
region within the bounds, depicted as F in Figure 2 which















Note that the F region has a simple shape since ϕ̂2 and
ϕ˘2 are aﬃne functions of ϕ1. The regions where ϕ1 ≤ 1/ρ
or ϕ2 ≤ 1/ρ are not of interest because they only yield zero
powers. Equations (15a) and (15b) are linear functions of ϕ1




) = mϕ1 − 1
ρ
(m− 1), (17)
that represents a linear curve that has a slope m (e.g., m of
the upper and lower bounds are 1/α21 and α12, resp.) which
crosses the point at (1/ρ, 1/ρ).
We will now look at an important property of the sum
power P in the ϕ-space. We substitute (17) into (14) and find






= κ(1− α12 + m(1− α21)). (18)
We see that by inserting any m between α12 and 1/α21,
(18) is always positive if α12α21 < 1. This implies the
following. There is always an increase in P as (ϕ1,ϕ2) are
increased along a line with slope m that takes any value
between α12 and 1/α21.
Definition 4 (Dominating vector by inclination n). A vector
(μ1,μ2) is said to dominate a vector (ν1, ν2) by an inclination
of n if μ1 − ν1 is nonnegative and (μ2 − ν2)/(μ1 − ν1) = n.
Corollary 5. For a region where all ϕ = (ϕ1,ϕ2) dominate
ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗1 ,ϕ∗2 ) by an inclination ofm, wherem = [α12, 1/α21],
P(ϕ) > P(ϕ∗). This also means that ϕ∗ is the point with the
least sum power for this region.
Next, we will consider the properties of the utility in the
inverse power price space. By inserting (13) into the utility






1)ϕ1 − ln(2)(1− α21)
ln(2)ρα21
, (19)
where T(u) = ln(2)α12α21−(1−α12α21)W(t(u)), W(u) is the
Lambert-W function and t(u) = −1/2 ln(2) exp(−u ln(2)).
The Lambert W function satisfies W(z)eW(z) = z [25].
W(t(u)) increases rapidly from − ln(2) towards zero as u
increases from zero. Thus, T(u) decreases towards a positive











It is noteworthy that both equations here are again linear and
have positive slopes, as illustrated in Figure 2. The region
below the curve specified by (19) is where u1 ≥ ur1 holds.
Similarly, the region above the line defined by (20) is where
u2 ≥ ur2 holds. Thus, requiring both conditions yields the
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Setting ur1 = 0 and ur2 = 0 in (19) and (20) would
return the upper and the lower bounds as in (15a) and
(15b), making Uϕ = F . As ur1 (ur2 resp.) is increased,
the slope of the upper (lower) bound decreases (increases).
The point of intersection of these two curves is where both
utility requirements are fulfilled with equality, as indicated by
(ϕ∗1 ,ϕ
∗
2 ) in Figure 2. The region Uϕ forms an open triangle
which is found within F . This implies that Uϕ is a subset of
F (Uϕ ⊆ F ).
4.3. Solution. From the properties we have considered above,
it is quite intuitive to conclude that the solution to problem
(11a), (11b) and (11c) is the μ pair that corresponds to
(ϕ∗1 ,ϕ
∗
2 ), where the utility requirements (11b) are fulfilled
with equality.





2 ) which solve programming problem (11a), (11b)

















ln 2(α12(1− α21) ln 2 + T(ur1)(1− α12))
. (22b)
These expressions are found by calculating ϕ1 and ϕ2 when (19)
equals (20) and then inverting them.
Proof. The constraint (11b) is satisfied in Uϕ. Furthermore,
for (11c) to hold, Uϕ must be a subset of F . This is only
fulfilled if the slopes of the upper and lower bounds of Uϕ
are within α12 and 1/α21. Otherwise, they would cross ϕ̂2 or
ϕ˘2, making Uϕ contain regions outside F . Because of this
property, Corollary 5 holds. Therefore, for any ur1 > 0 and
ur2 > 0 that yields a nonempty set Uϕ, the intersection of
(19) and (20) yields the inverse power prices with the least
sum power in region Uϕ, which correspond to (μ∗1 ,μ
∗
2 ).
4.4. Feasible Minimum Utility Requirements. We assume that
the arbitrator supports reasonable requirements such that 0 <
uri <∞. Given minimum utility requirements, ur1 and ur2, the
arbitrator should be able to determine if this pair is feasible,
that is, whether there exists a power pricing pair (μ∗1 ,μ
∗
2 )
that leads to a unique NE that fulfills these requirements
simultaneously. They are infeasible if all pricing pairs lead
to either nonunique NE or a unique NE whose utility tuple
does not fulfill the utility requirements.
Proposition 7. A minimum utility requirement (ur1,u
r
2) cho-
sen under the conditions above is feasible if and only if the
optimal power prices (μ∗1 ,μ
∗
2 ) calculated in (22a) and (22b)




Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Therefore, according to Proposition 7, the arbitrator
checks if (μ∗1 ,μ
∗
2 ) ∈ M in order to determine the feasibility
of the minimum utility requirements.
In Section 6, we give numerical simulations on energy-
eﬃciency comparing the noncooperative setting with pricing
and that without pricing as well as the cooperative setting
with pricing. Before that, we analyze the case with minimum
rate requirements in the next section.
5. Energy-Efficient Assignment with
Rate Requirements
In contrast to the previous section, we now investigate how
the power prices are chosen such that energy-eﬃciency as
well as minimum rate requirements are satisfied.
5.1. Optimization Problem. The arbitrator decides on the
power prices (μ1,μ2) such that the outcome satisfies the same
conditions as in Section 4.1 with a modification in (C3),
which we state as following.
(C3) Users transmit at the lowest powers possible satisfy-
ing minimum rate requirement Rri , i ∈ {1, 2}.
As before, if (μ1,μ2) ∈ M, conditions (C1) and (C2) are
automatically fulfilled. Condition (C3) can be achieved by


















where P(μ1,μ2) is defined as in (12). Before we come to
the solution, we present some analysis that will simplify its
derivation.
5.2. Analysis and Feasibility. Unlike in the previous section,
where both power allocation and prices have a direct influ-
ence on whether the utility requirements are fulfilled, only
the power allocation has a direct influence on the fulfillment
of the rate requirements. Therefore, we take a diﬀerent
approach by first determining the power allocation that
fulfills the rate requirements and simultaneously minimizes
the total power, and then calculate the optimal power prices
(μ∗1 ,μ
∗
2 ) that lead the users to this NE.
The relationship between the rate and the transmission

















⎠ = z, (24)
where z = (1/ρ, 1/ρ) T. This can be formulated as
(I− Γ(R)V)p = Γ(R)z, (25)










2R1 − 1 0
0 2R2 − 1
⎞
⎠. (26)
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The power vector that yields the rates (Rr1,R
r
2) is
p∗(R) = (I− Γ(Rr)V)−1Γ(Rr)z, (27)





2R2 − 1) + 1)





2R1 − 1) + 1)
ρ(1− α12α21(2R1 − 1)(2R2 − 1)) . (28b)
However, p∗i may be negative. For given rate require-
ments and channel coeﬃcients, we can verify if there
exists a feasible unique power vector (i.e., p ≥ 0, p /= 0,
where the inequality is componentwise) that fulfills the rate
requirements using the following proposition.
Proposition 8. The rate vector R is feasible if and only if
α12α21 < 1/(2R1 − 1)(2R2 − 1).
Proof. According to Theorem A.51 in [26], for any z > 0,
there exists a unique vector p∗ = (I− Γ(Rr)V)−1Γ(Rr)z ≥
0 if and only if ρ(Γ(Rr)V) < 1. ρ(X) = maxi|λi|,
which is the spectral radius, where λi are the eigenvalues
of the matrix X ∈ Rn×n. ρ(Γ(Rr)V) is calculated as√
(2R1 − 1)(2R2 − 1)α12α21. This implies that the require-
ments Rr are feasible if and only if α12α21 < 1/(2R1 − 1)(2R2 −
1).
Proposition 9. The power allocation that minimizes
P(p∗(R)) = p∗1 (R) + p∗2 (R) with rate requirements R ≥ Rr is
given by p∗(Rr) in (27), which fulfills the requirements with
equality.








2R2 − 1))(1 + α12
(
2R2 − 1))








2R1 − 1))(1 + α12
(
2R1 − 1))
ρ(α12α21(2R1 − 1)(2R2 − 1)− 1)2
> 0. (30)
This implies that for any R > Rr , P(p∗(R)) > P(p∗(Rr)).
Assuming that the powers p∗i are feasible and known, it
is straight-forward to determine the prices that should lead
the players to this NE. At NE, where each player chooses the
strategy that maximizes its utility, the necessary condition is





p∗i + αji p
∗
j







2R1 − 1)(2R2 − 1))










2R1 − 1)(2R2 − 1))





However, these prices do not necessarily lead to a unique
NE. We insert (31) into (9) to derive the condition such that
(μ∗1 ,μ
∗






































is only valid if α12α21 < 1. Therefore, to ensure that both
feasibility and the uniqueness of the NE are simultaneously
fulfilled, α12α21 < min(1, 1/(2R1 − 1)(2R2 − 1)) has to be
satisfied.
Suppose α12α21 > 1, for example, α12α21 = 10. There
are some values of (R1,R2), for example, (0.3, 0.3), which are
feasible but there are no corresponding prices that lead the
players to a unique NE that fulfills the requirements with
equality. This scenario corresponds to strong interference
[27]. Therefore, one solution could be to consider another
decoding strategy which is more complex and leads to a
diﬀerent achievable rate expression, which has a diﬀerent
game model.
5.3. Solution. The prices that solve (23a), (23b) and (23c) are
given by (μ∗1 (Rr),μ
∗
2 (Rr)) as in (32a) and (32b), provided
that α12α21 < min(1, 1/(2R
r
1 − 1)(2Rr2 − 1)), which ensures
the feasibility of the solution and the constraint (23c),
guaranteeing the uniqueness of the NE. The corresponding
NE strategy is pNE = p∗(Rr), which fulfills (23b) with
equality. Using Proposition 9, we can conclude that this
power allocation also fulfills (23a).
6. Simulations and Discussions
Here, we present numerical simulations on energy-eﬃciency
comparing the noncooperative setting with pricing and that
without pricing as well as the cooperative setting with pricing
with minimum utility requirements.
The Pareto boundaries for various (α12,α21) pairs are
plotted in Figure 3 for the noncooperative case with pricing.
It shows the feasible utility regions, given (α12,α21), (ur1,u
r
2),
ρ, and the corresponding optimal power prices (μ∗1 ,μ
∗
2 ).
This was done by first obtaining points in the utility region
(u1,u2) according to (2) by randomly varying the powers
p1 and p2, where p1 ∈ [0, pmax1 ] and p2 ∈ [0, pmax2 ].








0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
u1
(α12,α21) [μ1,μ2]
(0.1, 0.1) [0.69, 0.69]
(0.9, 0.1) [0.68, 0.52]
(0.9, 0.9) [0.46, 0.46]
(2.0, 0.1) [0.66, 0.38]
NE
Figure 3: The Pareto boundaries for various (α12,α21) as shown in
round brackets in the legend, (ur1,u
r
2) = (0.2, 0.2) and ρ = 10 dB.
The corresponding optimal prices as shown in square brackets. The
NE and (ur1,u
r
2) are in the identical position.
The scattered points are then grouped into equally spaced
bins in the u1 axis. Using the points with the highest u2 for
every bin, the Pareto boundary is plotted. Changing only ρ
does not have any eﬀect on the Pareto boundaries or the NE.
Practically, the operating points along the Pareto boundary
are achievable when the systems cooperate or by repeated
game (Folk theorem) [28].
As expected, the NE in the utility region, which is










2 )) into (2),
is found exactly at the utility requirements, independently
of the CCC values (α12,α21). The NE is very close to the
Pareto boundaries, indicating that it is indeed very close to
being a Pareto-eﬃcient operating point for various CCCs.
By increasing α12 = α21 simultaneously, the utility region
is expanded in that the intersections at the u1 and u2 axes
increase. The region is also observed to change from being
convex to being nonconvex as the product α12α21 becomes
larger. The reason for this is that prices are reduced so that
systems can reach the utility requirements at higher CCCs.
Lower prices mean that the maximum utility of a system
is higher, which is achieved when the other system pair
does not transmit. In this case, cooperation among systems
is more advantageous than noncooperation in achieving a
higher sum utility. Note that for a nonconvex utility region,
time-sharing between single-user operating points could be
used to improve the utilities. This requires the knowledge
of the time-sharing schedule at the transmitters and can be
considered in future work.
With regard to the optimal prices, which is shown in
the legend of Figure 3, we observe that the system with the
smaller CCC has to pay less than the one with the larger.
However, if both systems have large CCCs, both pay less.
We regard this pricing scheme as fair. On the one hand, the
system that causes more interference to the other is charged
with a higher price; on the other hand, if both systems suﬀer
from high interference from each other, both are encouraged
to transmit more power by means of price reduction so that
the utility requirements are met.







where Ri is the transmission rate, as in (1), of system i and
pi the corresponding power allocation. A similar function is
used to measure energy-eﬃciency for ad hoc MIMO links in
[29]. Figure 4 shows a comparison between energy-eﬃciency
in the following settings.
(S1) The NE achieved with pricing.
(S2) The NE achieved without pricing. The power allo-
cation is upper bounded by pmaxi as in (6) for a fair
comparison.
(S3) Both systems cooperatively choose their strategies to
achieve the highest sum utility, that is, u1 + u2. The
power allocation here is also upper bounded by pmaxi
for a fair comparison.
The operating point for the cooperative case was deter-
mined by numerically finding the power allocation that
yields the highest sum utility. The reason for maximizing the
sum utility instead of the energy-eﬃciency in (35) is that the
former leads to zero transmit powers.
The systems are to cooperate to maximize energy-
eﬃciency, the result is where both transmit powers are zero.
We see that in the noncooperative case, pricing improves
the energy-eﬃciency significantly. The amount of improve-
ment increases as the CCCs increase. The results with
cooperation prove to be superior when the CCCs are large,
whereas for low CCCs, noncooperation with pricing yields
better energy-eﬃciency. One might expect the outcome of
cooperation to be always superior to that of noncooperation.
This is not true here because in the case of cooperation,
the sum utility is maximized instead of E. In our scenario,
systems are only interested in maximizing their sum utility
but not energy-eﬃciency when cooperating.
7. Conclusions
In this work, we consider two communication system pairs
that operate in a distributed manner in the same spectral
band. In order to improve the system energy-eﬃciency,
we employ linear pricing to the utility of the systems.
Following that, we study the setting from a noncooperative
game-theoretic perspective, that is, we analyze the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Based on the
assumption that there exists an arbitrator that chooses the
power prices, we considered the problem of minimizing the
sum transmit power with the constraint of satisfying mini-
mum utility requirements and minimum rate requirements,
respectively. We derived analytical solutions for the optimal
power prices that solve these problems. Simulation results
show that the noncooperative operating points with pricing
are always more energy-eﬃcient than those without pricing.

















































































Figure 4: Comparison of energy-eﬃciency E with various CCCs. The noncooperative case with pricing (S1) is plotted with blue circles, the
noncooperative case without pricing (S2) with green diamonds, and the cooperative case with pricing (S3) with red squares.
A further extension of this work is to consider the case with
more than two users. This is much more involved because
there is no closed-form characterization of the prices that
induce a globally stable NE. However, suﬃcient conditions
for a unique NE can be used to define the set M for K users.
For this case, similar programming problems as in (11a),
(11b) and (11c) and (23a), (23b) and (23c) should be solved.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The analysis for the uniqueness of the NE in a game can be
done by studying the reaction curves of the players. Here, we
give a simple and geometric derivation.









































Figure 5: Illustration of the arrangement of the reaction curves. The solid blue line is l2(p1) given in (A.1) and the double solid red line is
l1(p2) given in (A.2). The dashed lines are the corresponding unbounded reaction curves. According to Table 1, (a) corresponds to case 3.
(b) corresponds to case 1 and analogously to case 2. (c) corresponds to case 4 and analogously to case 5. (d) corresponds to case 6. Case 7
occurs when the curves overlap.
The reaction curve li : [0, pmaxj ] → [0, pmaxi ] of a player
i is a function that relates the strategy of player j, j /= i, to
the best response of player i in case the best response is a
singleton [30]. The best response of player 1 and analogously
player 2 is given in (5) from which the reaction curve for

















where [x]+ represents the Euclidean projection of x on
the interval [0,∞). These bounds are required because the
strategy space of a player is constrained to [0,∞). The














where p1 ∈ [0, pmax1 ]. An intersection point of the reaction
curves, l1(p2) and l2(p1), consists of mutual best responses
which would be a NE strategy profile. Hence, the number of
intersections of the curves is the number of NEs in the game.
Next, we define an unbounded reaction curve by removing

























These curves can aid us in the analysis of the number of
intersection points of the bounded reaction curves and thus
the number of NEs. To do this we would study the position
of the intersection points of the unbounded reaction curves
with the axes. Each unbounded reaction curve intersects the
axes in two points. One point corresponds to pi = 0 and












where i /= j. These points are illustrated in Figure 5. Utilizing
these points, we can characterize geometrically the number
















Figure 6: Illustration of the number of NEs in diﬀerent interference
regions.
Table 1: Conditions for the number of NEs.
Case Condition Number of NEs
(1) p01 > p
max
1 ∧ p02 ≤ pmax2 Unique NE
(2) p01 ≤ pmax1 ∧ p02 > pmax2 Unique NE
(3) p01 > p
max
1 ∧ p02 > pmax2 Unique NE
(4) p01 = pmax1 ∧ p02 < pmax2 2 NEs
(5) p01 < p
max
1 ∧ p02 = pmax2 2 NEs
(6) p01 < p
max
1 ∧ p02 < pmax2 3 NEs
(7) p01 = pmax1 ∧ p02 = pmax2 Infinitely many NEs
of NEs in studying the position of p0i with respect to p
max
i ,
i = 1, 2. In Table 1, all possible positions of the intersection
points are listed with the corresponding number of NEs.
The arrangement of the reaction curves that resemble the
cases in Table 1, are illustrated in Figure 5. Accordingly, the
condition that fulfills cases one till three in Table 1 is the one
given in (8a) and (8b). In Figure 6, an illustration shows the
number on NEs that exist in dependence on the CCCs. The
region below the dashed line designates where a unique NE
always exists. Moreover, the case of interest in this paper is
marked as “concurrent transmission” which lies below this
dashed line.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
In the case of concurrent transmission which is achieved for
the conditions that (8a) and (8b) hold simultaneously, each
bounded reaction curve in this case is a linear function and is
not piece-wise linear as in the other cases. Therefore, we can














































and then transformed to an algorithm [31, Section 2.6]
p(t + 1) = (I− A)p(t) + b, (B.4)
where p(t) is the outcome at the tth iteration and I is the
identity matrix. The algorithm is globally convergent if the
spectral radius of (I − A) is less than one [31, Proposition
6.1]. The condition, α12α21 < 1, satisfies this requirement.
Since the concurrent transmission case satisfies α12α21 < 1,
the best response dynamics are then globally convergent.
C. Proof of Proposition 7
We first define U as the NE utility region which is achievable






















is the utility tuple at the unique NE corresponding to (μ1,μ2).
All points in U achieve concurrent transmission. That is,
0 < uNEi (μ1,μ2) < ∞ for i = {1, 2} as explained above
in Section 3.3. As we see, any (ur1,u
r
2) ∈ U is feasible by
definition.
From Proposition 1, we see that the only region that
leads to a unique NE with concurrent transmission is when
conditions (8a) and (8b) are satisfied, provided that α12α21 <
1. Since M is the equivalent formulation of the price region
where these conditions are satisfied, any (μ1,μ2) /∈M would
either lead to nonunique NE or to a unique NE without
concurrent transmission. The tuple that leads to a unique NE
without concurrent transmission never satisfies the utility
requirements because uri = 0 for any i is never chosen
as a requirement. Therefore, any (μ1,μ2) /∈M will lead to
infeasible utilities.











to feasible utilities at NE (ur1,u
r
2) since all tuples (μ1,μ2) ∈










2)) /∈M leads to
infeasible utilities.
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